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Action springs not from thought, butfrom a readinessfor
responsibility.
Dietrich Bonhoefferl
I. INTRODUCTION

Though the Genocide Convention was created to "liberate mankind
from [the] odious scourge" 2 of genocide, the dreams of its drafters have
still not come to fruition. The commission of genocide, widely considered
the most appalling of all crimes, 3 did not end with the signing and
ratification of the Convention in 1948. Genocide continues in the world
today.4 While its sentiments were noble and its aims commendable, the
Genocide Convention as it is interpreted and applied today is insufficient
to stop the commission of genocide in the world. In order to rid the
world of this crime, a new interpretation of the Convention is needed. If
the commission of genocide is truly to be prevented and punished, the
international community must come to accept the use of force to stop
such acts.

1. Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) was one of the leaders of Germany's
"Confessing Church" which opposed the Nazi influence on German Protestant churches
and the Nazi racial doctrines. He was arrested and imprisoned in 1943 for his efforts to
help a group of Jews escape to Switzerland. Bonhoeffer was hanged at the concentration
camp in Flossenburg on April 9, 1945. See The International Dietrich Bonhoeffer
Society, Who is Dietrich Bonhoeffer, available at http://www.dbonhoeffer.org/node/3
(last visited Jan. 27, 2006); see also Theologian of Life, TIME, May 9, 1960, at 53-54.
2. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
3. See Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office, Speech by Kerstin Muller
at the Stockholm International Forum on Preventing Genocide, Jan. 26, 2004 (referring
to genocide as "the most extreme kind of human rights violation"); see also ALAIN
DESTEXHE, RWANDA AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 15 (N.Y.U Press 1995)
(calling genocide "the most anti-human of all crimes" and "the most infamous of
crimes"); see also Statement by President Horst Kohler of Germany, quoted in If You
Will Be the Same After This, We Will Be Lost, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 28, 2005,
available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/01/28/quotesed3_.php (last visited Jan.
29, 2006) (describing the Holocaust as "the worst crime in human history").
4. See U.S. convinced of Darfur "genocide", BBC NEWS ONLINE, Feb. 1, 2005,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4227835.stm (last visited Jan. 27,
2006) (detailing the belief of the United States that genocide is being committed in
Darfur, Sudan).
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II. FRAMING THE ISSUE: THE HORRORS OF GENOCIDE AND THE
FAILURE OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION TO STOP IT

While it has probably become the best-known example of genocide,
the Nazi Holocaust was not the first time in the twentieth century that an
attempt was made to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious
group. Between 1915 and 1922, approximately 1.5 million Armenians
living in Turkey were systematically killed through a series of forced
deportations and massacres.6 Between 1932 and 1933, in response to
efforts by Ukrainians to seek independence from Soviet rule, Joseph
Stalin forced a famine upon the Ukrainians that scholars believe led to
somewhere between seven and ten million deaths.7 In December of
1937, the Japanese Imperial Army marched into China's capital city of
Nanking and murdered approximately half of the 600,000 inhabitants in
the Rape of Nanking. 8 But it was not until the horrors of the Nazi
Holocaust (1938 to 1945), in which approximately six million Jews,
Gypsies, and other minority groups were systematically murdered, 9 that
the international community, and specifically the United Nations, made
a concerted effort to identify and codify a response to the crime of
genocide. 10
It is generally accepted that the term "genocide" was first coined by a
Polish-Jewish lawyer named Raphael Lemkin in 1944."1 Lemkin used
the term to describe the policies of systematic and mass murder used by
the Nazis during the Holocaust. 12 While the Nazi Holocaust was neither
the first, nor regrettably the last, incident of genocide, it opened the eyes

5. Members of these four sub-groups (national, ethnical, racial, and religious) are
explicitly included within the ambit of the Genocide Convention. See Genocide
Convention, supra note 2, art. 2.
6. PETER BALAKIAN, THE BURNING TIGRIS: THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND
AMERICA'S RESPONSE 175-80 (HarperCollins 2003).
7. Anna Melnichuk, Ukraine Marks Famine That Killed Millions, ASSOCIATED

PRESS, Nov. 22, 2003.
8.

IRIS CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING: THE FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST OF WORLD

WAR II 99-104 (BasicBooks 1997).
9. The Website of the United States Holocaust Museum [hereinafter Holocaust
Museum], The Holocaust Encyclopedia, available at http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/
index.php?lang=en&Moduleld= 10005143 (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
10. See Genocide Convention, supra note 2.
11. Holocaust Museum, supra note 9, The Committee on Conscience, available at
http://www.ushmm.org/conscience/history/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
12. Id.

of the international community to mankind's horrific potential for
systematic and holistic cruelty.
In 1945, top Nazis at the Nuremberg Trials were charged with "crimes
against humanity" rather than genocide.1 3 However the indictment itself
accused the Nazis of having "conducted deliberate and systematic
genocide... in order to destroy particular races and classes of people
and national, racial or religious groups. ...
In the wake of the "never
again" mentality that permeated much of post-World War II international
affairs, the United Nations ratified the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on December 9, 1948.15
The Genocide Convention was an ambitious attempt by the international
community to codify concerted steps in attaching international criminal
liability to genocide and related crimes, and to establish a system
whereby the perpetrators of any future acts of genocide could be
punished.16 But while the Genocide Convention has been, at best, fairly
effective in punishing the perpetrators of acts of genocide, it has not met
its initial goal of preventing future acts of genocide from occurring.
Despite the ratification of the Genocide Convention in 194817 and its
entry into force in 1951,8 with 41 signatories and 133 parties, 19 the
commission of genocidal acts has continued.
Between 1975 and 1979, Cambodian Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot
orchestrated a systematic program of starvation, overwork, and executions,
targeted largely at ethnic minorities within Cambodia, which left
approximately two million people dead.2 ° In 1994, approximately 800,000
Rwandans of Tutsi descent were killed by Rwandan Hutu militias using
machetes and hoes, 21 at a rate as high as 10,000 per day.2 2 Between
13. Id.
14. See The Jewish Virtual Library: A Division of the American-Israeli Cooperative
Enterprise, Nuremberg Trial Proceedings-Indictment: Count Three, available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/Count3.html (last visited Feb. 3,
2006).
15. Genocide Convention, supra note 2.
16. See id.
17. The Website of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/htmLmenu3/
b/treaty lgen.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Strobe Talbott, Defanging the Beast (U.S. Policies Supported the Pol Pot
Activities in Kampuchea), TIME, Feb. 6, 1989, at 40.
21. Ross Herbert, Slaughter'sFifth Anniversary Remembered: 800,000 Were Slain
in Ggenocide of '94, WASHINGTON TIMES, July 5, 1999, at A11.

22. The Website for The History Place, Genocide in the 20th Century, Rwanda
1994, available at http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/rwanda.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2006).
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1992 and 1995, approximately 200,000 Bosnian-Muslims were slaughtered
by the Serbian forces of Slobodan
23 Milosevic in mass killings and various
other acts of "ethnic cleansing.,
While the Genocide Convention was a well-intentioned step in the
right direction, more must be done in order to rid the world of the
scourge 24 of genocide. As genocide is widely considered to be the most
horrific of all crimes, the leaders of the international community owe it
to their constituents to "put some teeth" in the Genocide Convention by
(a) increasing the speed by which acts of genocide are identified and
dealt with, and (b) placing more responsibility on states and international
alliances to employ forceful intervention to stop acts of genocide. This
comment will focus on the second prong of this recommendation: the
obligation of the international community to use force to stop acts of
genocide and whether precedents exist for such actions.25
III. THE EXISTING STRUTURE: THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
AND How IT WORKS

The Genocide Convention defines genocide as certain acts that are
done with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic,
racial, or religious group.26 For the purposes of the Convention, these
acts include: killing members of such a group; 27 causing serious mental
or bodily harm to the members of such a group;2 8 deliberately inflicting
on such a group conditions of life calculated to bring about the group's
physical destruction in whole or in part; 29 imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group; 30 and forcibly transferring children of
the group to another group. 3' Thus, a variety of acts are considered by
the Convention to constitute genocide, with the primary distinguishing
23.

William Drozdiak, Milosevic to Face Genocide Trial For Role in the War in

Bosnia; Yugoslav Ex-Leader FirstHead of State to Be So Charged,WASHINGTON POST,

Nov. 25, 2001, at A22.
24. Genocide Convention, supra note 2, pmbl.
25. For a discussion of the first prong of this recommendation, see Joshua M.
Kagan, Speeding Up the InternationalCommunity's Response Time in Addressing Acts
of Genocide: Deferring to the Judgment of Nongovernmental Organizations,34 INT'L J.
L. INFO. (forthcoming May 2006).

26.
27.
28.
29.

Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.

30.
31.

Id.
Id.

attribute being that such acts are committed against a national, ethnic,
racial, or religious group with the intention of destroying that group in
whole or in part. In addition to specific acts of genocide as defined
above, the Genocide Convention also attaches criminal liability to 32a
variety of associated acts including: conspiracy to commit genocide;
direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 33 attempt to commit
genocide; 34 and complicity to commit genocide. 35 This criminal liability
can attach to either responsible leaders or private individuals for the
commission of any of these aforementioned acts.36
Each contracting party to the Genocide Convention undertakes to
enact domestic legislation that gives effect to the provisions of the
Convention. In so doing, each state provides domestic penalties for
persons under that particular state's jurisdiction who are found to be
guilty of committing genocide or any of the other associated acts as
stated in the Convention.37 Under the Convention, persons charged with
the commission of genocide or one of the related acts may be tried in a
competent national court of the state where the act was committed 38 or
by an international penal tribunal which has jurisdiction over the
matter.3 9 The Genocide Convention states that the jurisdiction of this
international penal tribunal is established when the contracting parties
involved in the dispute have accepted such jurisdiction.4 0 It is
presumably under this framework, and in accordance with the U.N.
Security Council's Chapter VII powers of the U.N. Charter,4' that the
international community has established the ad hoc military tribunals for
Rwanda 42 and the former Yugoslavia 43 to try those responsible for the
genocidal acts committed in those nations.
It must also be assumed that the international penal tribunal
envisioned by the drafters of the Genocide Convention44 has now been
32.

Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. 3.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
art. 4.
Id.
art. 5.
Id. art. 6.
Id.
Id.

41. U.N. CHARTER art. 39; U.N. CHARTER art. 41; see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Jurisdiction
Appeal, ICTY, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (1995).
42. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was created by U.N. Security
Council Resolution 955 of November 8, 1994. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
43. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was created by
U.N. Security Council Resolution 827 of May 25, 1993. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
44. See Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. 6.
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established through the creation of the International Criminal Court
(ICC). The ICC was established by the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court on July 17, 1998, when 120 states signed the Statute.45
The Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002, after 60 signatories
had ratified it. 46 The Rome Statute specifically states that the subject
matter jurisdiction of the ICC extends to alleged cases of genocide,47
using the same definition of the crime that is found in the Genocide
Convention.4 8 Thus, for future incidents of genocide, it seems safe to
assume that the ICC will provide the forum for adjudication that was
initially proposed in the Genocide Convention.
But in order to try a person for allegedly committing genocide or any
of the related acts, the ICC must also have personal jurisdiction over that
person. The ICC's personal jurisdiction extends only to states that have
accepted the jurisdiction of the court either generally, by becoming a
party to the Rome Statute,4 9 or specifically, by accepting the court's
jurisdiction for a particular case or crime.5 0 The Court may then exercise
its jurisdiction if such jurisdiction has been accepted by either the state
where the alleged genocidal act occurred 51 or the state of which the
person accused of the crime is a national.52
Cases before the ICC, including those involving allegations of
genocide, may be initiated in one of three ways. The first way in which
the Court may exert jurisdiction over a case occurs when a situation is
referred to the ICC's Prosecutor by a State Party to the Rome Statute.53
The second way in which the Court may exercise jurisdiction occurs
when a case is referred to the Prosecutor by the U.N. Security Council,
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.54 The
third and final manner in which a case may be brought before
the ICC
55
occurs when the Prosecutor initiates an investigation herself.

45. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
(1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. art. 5.
See id. art. 6.
Id. art. 12(1).
Id. art. 12(3).
Id. art. 12(2)(a).
Id. art. 12(2)(b).
Id. art. 13(a).
Id. art. 13(b).
Id. art. 13(c).

While a judicial system may exist for trying those accused of
committing genocide and related acts, the Genocide Convention contains
several holes in the breadth of its treatment of, and its ability to stop, acts
of genocide. Specifically, the Convention neither explicitly provides for
means of intervening to stop acts of genocide that have already begun,
nor does it expressly suggest an appropriate way of bringing the
perpetrators of genocidal acts before a court. What the Genocide
Convention does provide, however, is that any contracting party may call
upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action
under the U.N. Charter as may be necessary to prevent or suppress
the commission of genocide or any of the other associated acts as
enumerated in the Convention. 56 Given that the Genocide Convention
imparts this ability to state parties, some questions which must then be
posited are: (1) If so called upon by a contracting party to the Genocide
Convention, what courses of action are available to the United Nations?;
(2) How effective are these actions in preventing and suppressing
genocidal acts?; and (3) Are there alternative measures, either presently
existing within the current system or on a theoretical basis, that would
better serve the goals of stopping existing incidents of genocide and
bringing the perpetrators to justice?

IV. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

First and foremost among the purposes underlying the creation of the
United Nations was the maintenance of international peace and security. 7
Not only is this emphasis evident from the language of the Charter itself,
but it also is reinforced when one looks at the circumstances that
surrounded the creation of the United Nations. The U.N. Charter was
signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945.58 Written soon after World
War II, its drafters sought to create an international body that was strong
enough to adequately address the acts of aggression and threats to world
peace that had been wrought during the war. It is not an overstatement,
then, to say that the United Nations, a body dedicated to maintaining
international peace and security, whose creation came at the culmination
of World War II, was created in large part to address the acts of
genocide and other widespread war crimes perpetrated in that war.

56.

See Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. 8.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
58. The Website of the United Nations, History of the U.N., http://www.
un.org/aboutun/history.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
59. See id
57.
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Within the structure of the United Nations, the Security Council is
given primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security
on a global level. 6 0 Member-states of the United Nations (of which
there were 191 at the time this comment was written) 61 grant the
Security Council the right to act on their behalf in carrying out its duties
associated with such responsibility. 62 Member-states also agree to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.63 Thus, the
Security Council is the most powerful arm of the United Nations and the
one which is best able to address issues that threaten the global
geopolitical equilibrium.
While the U.N. Charter grants the Security Council broad discretion in
acting on behalf of member-states to maintain peace and security on an
international level, the exact actions available to the Security Council in
acting on such authority are not necessarily clear. The Security Council
has the authority to determine whether a threat to the peace, 64 breach of
the peace, 65 or act of66
of aggression exists, as well as the authority to
determine what the United Nations' response should be to such a
situation.67 A U.N. response can take several forms, some that do not
involve the use of armed force, 68 and others that implement force to
maintain or restore international peace and security.6 9
Under its Chapter VII powers, the Security Council has the ability to
authorize and implement force in the maintenance or restoration of
international peace and security by using member-states' air, sea, or land
forces. 70 In accordance with this authorization, the Charter requires
member-states to make available to the Security Council any domestic
armed forces or other assistance that may be necessary in fulfilling its
Chapter VII powers. 71 Furthermore, the U.N. Charter grants the Security
Council the right to require the participation of either some or all
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
61. The Website of the United Nations, List of Member States, http://www.
un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
62. U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
63 Id. art. 25.
64. Id. art. 39.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
69. Id. art. 42.
70. Id.
71. Id. art. 43(1).

469

member-states in such actions 72 and calls on all member-states to work
collaboratively in employing the measures chosen by the Security
Council.73
The U.N. Charter also recognizes the inherent right of states, whether
individually or collectively, to act in self-defense.74 While such action
would be undertaken independently of the United Nations, the affirmation
of such a right in the U.N. Charter warrants mention along with the
courses of action available to the United Nations. Thus, the Charter
provides two possibilities for using force to stop genocidal acts or other
breaches of international peace and security: (1) concerted collaborative
actions initiated and authorized by the Security Council under its
Chapter VII powers, 75 and (2) actions taken in self-defense, either
unilaterally by a state or collaboratively by some sort of international
alliance.76
On a pragmatic level, precedents exist within the current U.N. system
for the use of forceful intervention to provide humanitarian assistance
and to stop armed conflict. In each of the examples outlined in the
following sections, the United Nations deployed peacekeeping troops in
an effort to either create or maintain a peaceful situation. But the weak
mandates, limited resources, and lack of international support in each
situation led to the significant shortcomings of the U.N. peacekeeping
missions to Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda.
A. Somalia

After the March 1992 cease-fire 77 between rival warlords appeared to
end a bloody civil war in Somalia, the Security Council established the
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).7 8 But the U.N.
peacekeepers faced hostility from the very civilians whom they were
seeking to protect.7 9 In December 1992, the United States initiated
Operation Restore Hope, 80 under which they agreed to assume the

72.
73.
74.

75.
76.
77.
(1993).

Id.art. 48.
Id.art. 49.
Id.art. 51.

Id. art. 42.

Id.
art. 51.
Jonathan Stevenson,

78.

Hope Restored in Somalia?, 91 FOREIGN POLICY

138-54

Leonard Doyle, Armies of Peace Patrol a World Ravaged by War, THE
Sept. 6, 1992, at 12.
79. See Stevenson, supra note 77.
80. Eric Ransdell, Strangers in a Strange Land, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Dec. 21, 1992, at 60.
INDEPENDENT (LONDON),
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unified command of the operation in accordance with Security Council
Resolution 794.81

However, Somali warlords had little respect for the U.N. peacekeepers
or for the U.S. soldiers that were bolstering the U.N force. United
Nations peacekeepers were killed8 2 and the bodies of dead U.S. soldiers
were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. 83 Not long after two
U.S. Black Hawk helicopters were shot down during a brutal 15-hour
battle in Mogadishu 84 the U.S. government decided to withdraw its
troops.
In 1995, the United Nations also withdrew the remaining
peacekeepers
from Somalia 86 in what is now considered a failed attempt
at peacekeeping.
B. Bosnia
In Resolution 743 of February 21, 1992,87 the Security Council
established the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to create
peace and security necessary for the negotiation of a peace settlement in
the former Yugoslavia.88 Security Council Resolution 776 of September
14, 199289 specifically extended and enlarged UNPROFOR's presence
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But the U.N. peacekeepers had a weak mandate, 90
as well as deficiencies in their level of training, equipment, and chain of

81. S.C. Res. 794 8, U.N. SCOR, 47 U.N. SCOR at 63, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794
(1992).
82. Judy Keen, Somalia's Lessons Alter U.S. and U.N. Policies, USA TODAY, Feb,
27, 1995, at 5A.
83. Thomas W. Lippman and Barton Gellman, A Humanitarian Gesture Turns
Deadly, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 10, 1993, at Al.
84. The battle of October 3-4, 1993, which pitted U.N. peacekeepers and U.S.
troops against the guerillas of militia leader Mohamed Farah Aideed, was the most
intense fighting of the Somali campaign. See Keith B. Richburg, Somalia Battle Killed
12 Americans, Wounded 78, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 5, 1993, at Al.
85. Less than three weeks after the Mogadishua battle that killed 12 American
soldiers, President Clinton began ordering the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia.
See Keith B. Richburg, Somalis Express FamiliarFears Over US. Troop Withdrawal,
WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 24, 1993, at A27.
86. Keen, supra note 82.
87. S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47 U.N. SCOR at 42, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743
(1992).
88. See id.
89. S.C. Res. 776, U.N. SCOR, 3114th meeting, S/RES/776 (1992).
90. lan Black & Michael White, Safety Zones Urgedfor Besieged Towns, THE
GUARDIAN (LONDON), Apr. 21, 1993, at 10.

command and control. 91 These shortcomings inhibited the ability of
UNPROFOR to protect the civilian population. As a result, in July
1995, the U.N. peacekeepers could only stand by helplessly as Bosnian
Serb soldiers separated Muslim families and methodically murdered
at
92
least 6,000 people in the supposed "U.N. safe area" of Srebrenica.
C. Rwanda
In October 1993, the Security Council passed Resolution 872, 9'
which established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR).94 In August 1993, UNAMIR helped to broker the Arusha
Accords, which formally ended a three-year civil war between the Tutsi
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Hutu government. 95 While
observers noted that Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was not
especially committed to the ceasefire, 96 there was a relative lull in the
violence following the Accords. 97 But when President Habyarimana
died in a plane crash on April 6, 1994, the hardliners in his Hutu
government took the opportunity to unleash a campaign of mass killings
against the country's Tutsis. 98 After countries began to unilaterally
withdraw their contingents from the U.N. peacekeeping forces, 99 the
Security Council passed Resolution 912 on April 21, 1994,100 reducing
UNAMIR's presence in Rwanda from 2,548 to 270 peacekeepers.101
However, as conditions worsened, the Security Council changed its
mind and passed Resolution 918 on May 17, 1994,102 which called for an
increase of UNAMIR troops, up to a total of 5,500.13 Unfortunately, it
took nearly six months for member-states to provide the troops. 104 In
late 1995, the Rwandan government stated that the UNAMIR was not

91. V.V. Voblenko, MultinationalPeacekeeping Operations in the Balkans: Past
and Present,MILITARY THOUGHT, Sept. 1, 2001, at 78, 81.
92. Peter Finn, NATO Fails to Capture Key Suspect in Bosnia; Karadzic Eludes
Arrest on Genocide Charges,WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 1, 2002, at A14.
93. S.C. Res. 872, U.N. SCOR, 3288th meeting, S/RES/872 (1993).
94. Id.
95.

Holly J. Burkhalter, The Question of Genocide. The Clinton Administration

and Rwanda, WORLD POL'Y J., Dec. 22, 1994, at 44.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99.

Jennifer Parmelee, Rwandans Ever More Isolated; Reporters, Belgian Troops

Pulling Out, THE WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 16, 1994, at A 12.
100. S.C. Res. 912, U.N. SCOR, 3368th meeting, S/RES/912 (1994).
101.

Id.

102.

S.C. Res. 918, U.N. SCOR, 3377th meeting, S/RES/918 (1994).

103.
104.

See id.
UN. Peacekeeping: Some Questions andAnswers, 34 U.N. CHRONICLE 64, 65

(1997).
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responsive to the needs of Rwanda and asked the U.N. peacekeeping
troops to leave. 105 The Security Council complied
with this request, and
10 6
in April 1996 UNAMIR troops left Rwanda.
In each of these aforementioned situations, the United Nations
presumably had good intentions in acting under its Chapter VII powers
to establish international peacekeeping missions.' 0 7 The failures of these
missions should be seen not as an indication of the impracticality or
unfeasibility of such peacekeeping missions in general, but rather as an
indication of the shortcomings of international peacekeeping forces
within the current United Nations system.
It can rationally be argued that each of these missions was doomed
from the start due to the lack of a strong mandate, appropriate resources,
and necessary international support. But as mentioned earlier, collaborative
international actions initiated and authorized by the U.N. Security
Council under its Chapter VII powers are not the only possible means of
action contemplated by the Charter. In affirming the inherent right of
individual and collective acts of self-defense,108 the U.N. Charter also
implicitly recognizes the potential for humanitarian intervention and the
use of force in international peacekeeping missions that fall outside the
mandate and control of the Security Council. There is also an existing
precedent for international military actions aimed at creating or
preserving a state of international peace and security which have not
been authorized by the Security Council, and thus fall outside the
purview of the United Nations.
V. THE INITIATION OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION THROUGH
UNILATERAL OR REGIONAL ACTION: KOsOvo

During 1998, armed conflicts between the occupying Serbian Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) military and the police forces of Slobodan
Milosevic and the ethnic Albanian rebel force, the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA), led to the death of over 1,500 Kosovar Albanians' 0 9 and
105.

Farhan Haq, Rwanda: Stalemate Over U.N. Peacekeeping Mandate,

INTER

PRESS SERVICE, ENGLISH NEWS WIRE, Dec. 10, 1995.

106. Probe Into Allegations of Arms Supplies to Continue: U.N. Troops Leave, New
Office To Be Set Up (Rwanda), 33 U.N. CHRONICLE 38, 39 (1996).
107. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
108.

U.N. CHARTER art. 51.

109. The Website of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO's role in Kosovo,
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).

the displacement of 400,000 others." l0 In response, the United Nations
Security Council issued Resolutions 1160 (March 31, 1998)..' and 1199
(September 23, 1998). 112 Resolution 1160 condemned the use of force by
both sides involved in the conflict and called on the parties to reach a
peaceful reconciliation of their differences.' 13 Resolution 1199 demanded
that both sides cease hostilities and maintain a ceasefire, and that the
FRY allow Kosovar refugees to return to their homes and give aid
agencies full access to Kosovo.'
But Milosevic and the FRY army
failed to comply with these provisions. 115
Soon after, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO)
warned the Serbs that the alliance would conduct airstrikes against
Milosevic's forces in Kosovo if they did not comply with the Security
Council resolutions." 6 With the threat of a NATO attack on the Serb
forces appearing imminent, Milosevic agreed to a cease-fire on October
13, 1998.' Among other things, the cease-fire agreement called for NATO
planes to fly over the area and monitor both sides' compliance with the
agreement." 8 On October 24, 1998, the Security Council passed Resolution
1203,11 9 which was aimed at protecting unarmed 2envoys
on the ground
0
as they monitored compliance with the cease-fire.
The cease-fire agreement disintegrated and the violence re-escalated
when a mass grave site for ethnic Albanians was discovered in Racak,
Yugoslavia, on January 15, 1999.121 The discovery of the massacre that
had occurred at Racak gave the international community proof that
Milosevic had acted in violation of the cease-fire agreement. 122 As the
fighting intensified, NATO leaders warned Milosevic that an air strike
was imminent if he did not accept a permanent resolution of the
110. Id.
111.
S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 3868th meeting, S/RES/I 160 (1998).
112. S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 3930th meeting, S/RES/i 199 (1998).
113. S.C. Res. 1160, supra note I 11.
114. S.C. Res. 199, supranote 112.
115. World: Europe New Warning to Milosevic, B.B.C. NEWS ONLINE, Sept. 29,
1998, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/182379.stm (last visited Jan.
27, 2006).
116. David J. Lynch, NATO Poisedfor Airstrikes: Attack on Yugoslav Forces Could
Come As Early As Today, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 1998, at IA.
117. R. Jeffrey Smith, Kosovo Accord Eases Crisis, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 14,
1998, at Al.
118. Jane Perlez, Milosevic Accepts Kosovo Monitors, Averting Attack, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 1998, at Al.
119. S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3937th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1203 (1998).
120. See id.
121. 40 Slain Ethnic Albanians Are Buried in Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1999,
at A12.
122. See id.
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conflict. 23 When Milosevic ignored these warnings, NATO authorized
airstrikes against Serbia on March 24, 1999.124
The reaction of the international community, and specifically the
United Nations, to the NATO airstrikes was mixed. U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan gave the airstrikes his implicit endorsement by
blaming the resort to force on Milosevic's continuing resistance to a
political settlement. 125 At the same time, Mr. Annan criticized NATO
for having initiated
the airstrikes without the authorization of the
1 26
Security Council.
Was the NATO action in Kosovo really an unauthorized intervention?
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter affirms a member-state's inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense. 127 However, this affirmation is
constrained in a number of ways. Article 51 goes on to recognize the
existence of such a right of self-defense (a) for member-states against
whom an armed attack occurs, 128 and (b) only until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. 129 Thus, construing this authorization to apply to states (or
groups of states) against whom an armed attack has not explicitly
occurred, at a point in time in which the Security Council has already
issued relevant resolutions, seems to be tenuous at best. However, that
does not necessarily imply that unilateral humanitarian intervention is
completely without merit.
Elaborating on the International Law Commission (ILC)13 ° State
Responsibility principles for humanitarian intervention under state of
necessity, 13 Professor George Walker suggests that:

123.

Jane Perlez, U.S. Negotiator at the Kosovo Talks Visits Milosevic, N.Y. TIMES,

Feb. 17, 1999, at A3.
124. Barton Gellman, U.S., Allies Launch Air Attack on Yugoslav Military Targets;
Two MiGs Reported Shot Down, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 25, 1999, at Al.
125. See Judith Miller, The Secretary General Offers Implicit Endorsement of

Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at A13.
126. Id.
127.
128.

U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
Id.

129. Id.
130. The International Law Commission is an agency of the U.N. General
Assembly composed of leading international lawyers from member-states. See 1 SIR
ARTHUR WATTS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1949-1998 16 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1999).
131. See Report of the International Law Commission, 53rd session, U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 10) at 194-206, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 & Corr. 1 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 ILC Report].

In collective humanitarian intervention under state of necessity,- all states
involved in the intervention, the affected state and the collective interveners,
retain their inherent rights of individual and collective self-defense in conformity
with the Charter and international law, e.g., the principles of necessity and
proportionality.... With respect to the intervention, this would mean that
interveners retain rights of individual and collective self-defense from unit
through national and collective levels, including rights of anticipatory selfdefense against the affected state and all other comers, to the extent that
132 states
recognize anticipatory self-defense as legitimate during the Charter era.

In order for a state of necessity to exist, a self-defensive act must be
the only way for a state to safeguard an essential interest against a grave
and imminent peril, and that act must not seriously impair an essential
interest of the state towards which the obligation exists, or of the
international community as a whole. 133 Furthermore, the state asserting
the existence of a state of necessity must not have contributed to the
situation of necessity. 34 Thus, NATO's actions are justified under ILC
State Responsibility principles if: (a) the protection of the ethnic Albanians
in Kosovo was an essential interest; (b) the actions of Milosevic and the
FRY army placed these ethnic Albanians in a state of grave and
imminent peril; (c) NATO either intervened in an Albanian state or, if in
a FRY area, the aggressive actions of the FRY had nullified any existing
obligation owed to them by NATO; (d) the intervention did not impair
an essential interest of the international community as a whole; and
(e) NATO had not contributed to the existence of the state of necessity.
Assuming, for the moment, that the unilateral actions of NATO in
Kosovo fell outside of the U.N. Charter's affirmation of the right of
individual or collective self-defense, 135 the central inquiry must then be:
Do these NATO actions represent the emergence of an acceptable
customary international norm, or are they simply an aberration?
International law can be created in one of three ways: (a) as customary
international law,' 36 (b) by international agreement, 3 7 or (c) through
derivation of the common legal practices of the world's major legal
systems. 38 Customary international law is the result of general and
consistent state practice which is followed out of a sense of legal
obligation. 39 Leading international scholar Antonio Cassese 140 has
132. George K. Walker, Principlesfor Collective Humanitarian Intervention to
Succor Other Countries' Imperiled Indigenous Nationals, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 35,

108-09 (2002).
133. See 2001 ILC Report, supra note 131, art. 25, at 194.
134. Id.
135.
136.

U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102. 1(a) (1987).

137.
138.
139.

Id § 102.1(b).
Id. § 102.1(c).
Id § 102.2.
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contended that the NATO action in Kosovo may have been the genesis
of a customary international norm condoning unilateral humanitarian
intervention to end large-scale atrocities. 14 1 Some scholars have gone
even further in asserting that such a customary international norm
already exists. 142 Though scholarly opinion seems largely to disagree with
such an assertion, 143 the fact that the matter is in question at all seems to
add a degree of legal legitimacy to acts of unilateral humanitarian
intervention.
One must concede, however, that humanitarian intervention to stop
acts of genocide is only part of the equation. Parties to the Genocide
Convention agree to both prevent and punish acts of genocide. 144 In the
hopes of preventing future genocides and of holding responsible those
persons who led or fostered such genocides, there must be a means for
capturing the war criminals and others who have perpetrated these acts.

140. Antonio Cassese (Italy) fulfilled an appointment as a justice on the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia from 1993-2000, serving as
the Tribunal's President in 1993 and 1995. He was elected to the International
Commission of Jurists in 1990. Cassese was awarded the Commission's Man for Peace
Award in 1995 and its Robert G. Storey Award for Leadership in 1997. Professor
Cassese has taught International Law at the University of Florence since 1981, and has
served as a visiting professor at numerous universities including the Universities of
Cambridge and Oxford. Information from The Website of the International Commission
of Jurists, Antonio Cassese, available at http://www.icj.org/article.php3?id article
=17&id rubrique=13 (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
141. Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniura lus Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International
Legitimation of ForcibleHumanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10
EUR. J. INT'L L. 23 (1999) ([T]his particular instance of breach of international law may
gradually lead to the crystallization of a general rule of international law authorizing
armed countermeasures for the exclusive purpose of putting an end to large-scale
atrocities amounting to crimes against humanity and constituting a threat to the peace.").
142. Steve G. Simon, The Contemporary Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian
Intervention, 24 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 117, 144 (1993) ("[N]ations do possess the right to
intervene unilaterally for humanitarian purposes in both rescue and non-rescue cases so
long as the intervention is done properly."); Jeremy Levitt, HumanitarianIntervention by
Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra
Leone, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 333, 375 (1998) ("[T]here has been a shift in the law
de lege ferenda, permitting unilateral humanitarian intervention by groups of states and
regional actors in internal conflicts.").
143. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The UN, NATO, and International Law After
Kosovo, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 57, 82 (2000) ("Whatever the arguments, international legal
rules are not easily changed. One act not in conformity with the rules does not eliminate
a legal regime, unless one finds overwhelming support for the change.").
144. Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.

VI. BRINGING THE PERPETRATORS TO JUSTICE: CAPTURING
THOSE GUILTY OF COMMITTING GENOCIDE

Because the Genocide Convention calls on its member-states not only
to prevent acts of genocide, but also to punish those responsible, it
logically follows that the perpetrators of such genocidal acts should be
brought to justice. As with the case of humanitarian intervention, the
capturing of war criminals and others who commit acts of genocide or
other crimes against humanity can be carried out in two forms: (a) within
the U.N. system and with U.N. endorsement, or (b) outside the U.N.
system as a unilateral or multilateral act. While the weight of opinion
seems to favor actions within the U.N. system, precedents exist for both
situations, and in certain circumstances urgency and necessity have
warranted the use of the latter option.
A. Slobodan Milosevic
After 11 weeks of bombing, NATO finally suspended its military
campaign against Milosevic's FRY forces on June 10, 1999.145 NATO
Secretary-General Javier Solana gave the order after verifying that FRY
troops began their withdrawal from Kosovo. 146 Soon the nationalistic
tide that had brought Milosevic to power began to turn on him. On
September 24, 2000, Milosevic lost the presidential election to Vojislav
Kostunica. 147 On April 1, 2001, Milosevic was arrested on charges of
abuse of power and theft of state funds after a standoff with FRY
police. 48 Despite the international call to hand Milosevic over to The
Hague to be tried on charges of crimes against humanity, Kostunica's
government appeared ready to stand by its declaration that it would try
Milosevic in Belgrade instead. 49 On June 28, 2001, under mounting
international pressure, the Yugoslavian government extradited Milosevic
to the International Court of Justice (ICTY). 5 ° Upon Milosevic's

145. NATO Ends Bombing, BBC NEWS ONLINE, June 10, 1999, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/365849.stm (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
146. Id
147. Will Milosevic Go?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 2000, available at http://www.
economist.com/displaystory.cfm?storyid=381876 (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
148. R. Jeffrey Smith, Milosevic Arrested at Belgrade Villa; Ex-Leader's Surrender
Follows Standoff,WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 1, 2001, at Al.

149. Leaders Want Milosevic Handed Over, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Apr. 2, 2001,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi!world/europe/1254270.stm (last visited Jan. 27,
2006).
150. David J. Lynch, Milosevic Turned Over to UN. Tribunal; Former Dictator
Sent to Face Charges in the Hague, USA TODAY, June 29, 2001, at 8A.
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extradition, more than $1 billion of relief began to flow into Yugoslavia
to help rebuild the country's battered economy.15 1
On November 22, 2001, the ICTY indicted Milosevic on charges of
genocide and complicity in genocide for his role in the murder of
thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Croats.' 52 However, on March 11, 2006,
before Milosevic's trial could reach its conclusion, the former Yugoslav
leader was found dead in his Hague prison cell. 153 Nonetheless, the
extradition of Slobodan Milosevic to the ICTY is an example of the way
in which the architects of the U.N. system intended for war criminals to
be tried. But not all accused perpetrators of war crimes or crimes against
humanity have been brought to justice in such a way.
B. Adolph Eichmann
During the Holocaust, Adolph Eichmann was in charge of planning
and implementing the "Final Solution," the Nazi's methodical and
programmatic system of killing that led to the murder of over 13 million
people. 154 Though arrested at the end of World War II, Eichmann had
not yet become well-known and he was able to escape from an American
internment camp in 1946 and flee to Argentina. 55 In 1960, agents of
MOSSAD, Israel's intelligence agency, kidnapped Eichmann from
Buenos Aires. 156 The agents then
forcibly brought him back to Israel to
57
stand trial in an Israeli court.'
151. Milosevic Extradition Unlocks Aid Coffers, BBC News Online, June 29, 2001,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1413144.stm (last visited Jan. 27,
2006).
152.
Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, Indictment, ICTY Case No. IT-01-51-1,
available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ii0 11122e.htm (last visited
Jan. 27, 2006); see also Suzanne Daley, A Full Charge of Genocidefor Milosevic, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001, at A8.
153. Marlise Simons, Milosevic Died of HeartAttack, Autopsy Shows, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 2006, atAl.
154. See Adolph Eichmann: Architect of Evil, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Mar. 3, 2000,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/665219.stm (last visited Jan. 27,
2006); see also LORD RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL, THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN 8-10, 31
(Heinemann 1962).
155. See Peter Z. Malkin & Harry Stein, EICHMANN IN My HANDS 74-77 (Warner
Books 1990); see also The Jewish Virtual Library: A Division of the American-Israeli
Cooperative Enterprise, Adolph Eichmann, available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.
org/jsource/Holocaust/eichmann.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
156. See Decline of the Superspies, TIME, Mar. 23, 1987, at 32; see also Malkin &
Stein, supra note 155, at 186-90; see also RAANAN REIN, ARGENTINA, ISRAEL, AND THE
JEWS 162 (Martha Grenzeback trans., Univer. Press of Maryland 2003).
157. See Rein, supra note 156, at 163; see also Alan Mintz, Foreward to HAIM

Argentina contested such an invasion of their sovereignty and brought
Israel before the U.N. Security Council. 5 8 Dealing with such a highly
sensitive issue, the Security Council did not order Israel to return
Eichmann, but instead requested that Israel make appropriate reparation
to Argentina. 159 The District Court of Jerusalem proceeded with the trial
and indicted Eichmann on fifteen separate counts, including crimes
against humanity and crimes against the Jewish people.160 After a highly
publicized trial lasting eight months, the Israeli court convicted Eichmann
on all counts and sentenced him to death. 161 Adolph Eichmann was
hanged in 1962.162
The Eichmann case serves as an example of the capturing of a war
criminal outside of the U.N. framework. The fact that the Security
Council did not order Israel to return Eichmann to Argentina seems to
indicate that such acts are permitted, if not authorized, under certain
circumstances. The important question then becomes: Did Eichmann
establish a customary norm for capturing international war criminals or
should the case simply be limited to its facts and given no precedential
effect? Political theorist/philosopher Hannah Arendt 163 has argued
that the kidnapping of Adolph Eichmann, while justified under the
circumstances, should be limited to just such circumstances, and set no
international legal precedent. 164 Other scholars have largely echoed this
sentiment. 165 However, while it is not my contention that the Eichmann
case sets a general precedent for capturing all war criminals outside
GOURI, FACING THE GLASS BOOTH: THE JERUSALEM TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN, at IX-XI

(Michael Swirsky trans., Wayne State Univ. Press 2004).
158. See S.C. Res. 138, U.N. SCOR, 865th meeting, S/4349 (1960).
159. Id.
160. Holocaust Museum, supra note 9; The Eichmann Trial, available at http://
www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/index.php?Moduleld= 10005179&Type=normal+article (last
visited Jan. 27, 2006).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. The Jewish Virtual Library, Biography of Hannah Arendt, available at http://
www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourcelbiography/arendt.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
164.

See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY

OF EVIL 242-43 (Viking Press 1963).
165. See, e.g., Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., The Limits of Legitimacy: The
Rome Statute's Unlawful Application to Non-state Parties, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 63, 78

(2003) ("[T]he Eichmann case represents a single precendent, arising in the most unusual
circumstances, and involving the most horrific atrocities in history."); see also Matthew
Lippman, Genocide: The Trial of Adolf Eichmann and the Quest for Global Justice, 8
BUFF. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 45, 62 (Quoting Golda Meir as stating that the abduction of
Eichmann did not constitute a precedent because "modem history knows of no such
monster as Adolf Eichmann."); see also Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, Jurisdiction
Over Persons Abducted in Violation of InternationalLaw in the Aftermath of United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 5 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 205, 225 (1998) ("Furthermore,

the case is not a good example of customary international law on jurisdiction because of
the extraordinary crimes of Adolf Eichmann.").
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of the U.N. system, it seems reasonable to conclude that the perpetrators
of acts of genocide share the greatest degree of culpability with
Adolph Eichmann, and hence they could be brought to justice in a
similar fashion.
Having examined the legal framework of the U.N. system and some
precedents for both humanitarian intervention and bringing war criminals to
justice, the critical issue then becomes the role of the Genocide
Convention itself. Does the Convention bind its state-parties to act in
cases of genocide? If so, what sort of action is appropriate? If not, what
is the role of the Convention?
VII. THE OBLIGATION TO ACT IN THE FACE OF GENOCIDAL ACTS
The language of the Convention has been examined earlier in this
comment to assess whether the Genocide Convention obligates its stateparties to act to prevent or punish acts of genocide. As previously
mentioned, the architects of the Genocide Convention seem to have
envisioned a two-part system for its structure and application. On a
national level, contracting parties would agree to enact domestic
legislation that gives effect to the provisions of the Convention, provide
domestic penalties for persons in breach of the Convention, and try
perpetrators in a competent tribunal of the state in which the act is
committed. 66 On a supra-national level, the Convention also envisioned
the use of an international penal tribunal. 167 But other than requesting
action from the United Nations itself, 68 the Genocide Convention is
silent regarding the actual steps that countries are permitted or obligated
to take to avert or suppress the commission of genocide abroad.
A. Labeling a Situation as "Genocide "
What are the implications of calling an act "genocide"? If the Genocide
Convention does not create an obligation for member-states to react,
then describing a particular atrocity as "genocide" would not necessarily
entail any sort of requisite action. But why, then, is the word used so
conservatively? 169 After the British television network ITN aired footage
166. Genocide Convention, supra note 2, arts. 5-6.
167. Id. art. 6.
168. Id. art. 8.
169. See Fausto Pocar, Preventing Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, 98 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L PROC. 46, 47 (2004).

of the Bosnian-Serb controlled Omarska camp in 1992,170 U.S. officials
in the Bush administration were instructed to avoid labeling the
atrocities as "genocide."' 17 1 Despite evidence to the contrary, officials
of the succeeding Clinton administration continued to assert from 19931995 that there was no obligation to act in Bosnia because the atrocities
were being committed by both sides. 172 In 1994, the Clinton administration
also ordered government officials not to use the term "genocide" to
describe the crisis in Rwanda, due to the implications of such a label. 73
Referring to the Rwandan atrocities in 1998, President Clinton even
referenced the profound effect that labeling the crisis as genocide would
have wrought. 174 Thus, it seems evident that U.S. policy in both the
Bosnian and Rwandan crises emphasized the importance of labeling (or
not labeling) a situation as "genocide" and the resultant obligations and
expectations that ensue from the label.
B. What Obligations?
Precisely what obligations does the use of the term "genocide" create?
International Court of Justice Judge Brunno Simma has contended that
the commission of acts of genocide may create an obligation for
member-states to the Convention to stop such actions. 75 However,

170. See Omarska: A Vision of Hell, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Nov. 2, 2001, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/I634250.stm (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
171. See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE 31 (Carolina Academic Press, 1997)
("U.S. officials were instructed to avoid using the 'genocide' label with respect to Bosnia
so as not to trigger obligations under the Genocide Convention, which obliges parties to
prevent and punish acts of genocide.").
172. Id. ("Testifying before Congress in May 1993, Secretary of State Christopher
refused to acknowledge that Serbs were committing genocide in Bosnia,
asserting instead that 'all sides' were responsible for the atrocities there-thus
removing the imperative for action. Notwithstanding clear evidence to the
contrary, this would remain the party line until two years later, in March 1995,
when Clinton Administration officials would leak the finding of a classified
CIA study that 90 percent of ethnic cleansing had been carried out by Serbs
pursuant to a policy designed to destroy and disperse the non-Serb population.").
173. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 1995 46 (1994) ("A few weeks
after the massacres had begun, when it had long been evident that genocide was taking
place, a senior member of the Clinton administration ordered officials not to speak of
'genocide' because the term could increase the moral pressure on the President and force
him to act."); see also Justice Richard Goldstone, The Trial of Sadaam Hussein: What
Kind of Court Should ProsecuteSadaam Hussein and Othersfor Human Rights Abuses?,
27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1490, 1500 (2004) (Stating that the State Department "did
not want to use the word 'genocide' because it would attract certain international
obligations.").
174. See Clinton's Painful Words of Sorrow and Chagrin, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
1998, at A12.
175. See Brunno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10
EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1999).
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former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell has asserted that the United
States satisfies its obligations under the Convention by providing money
for humanitarian assistance, engaging diplomatically, and working through
the U.N. Security Council towards a resolution. 176 The U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee released a 1989 report on the Genocide Convention in
which it found the only obligation created by the Convention to be the
77
enactment of domestic legislation to make genocide a municipal crime.
Leading international scholar Professor Winston Nagan, 78 on the other
hand, has identified the obligation to both prevent and punish acts of
genocide as an obligation erga omnes, 79 that is, one that is owed to the
international community as a whole. 80 Finally, Professor Joseph Betz' 8'
seems to go even further by implying that state-parties to the Genocide
Convention had an obligation, which they failed to meet, to stop the
atrocities in Kosovo and Rwanda. 82 While the precise obligation imposed
by the Genocide Convention remains unclear, it seems evident from
these statements that declaring an incident to be "genocide" does trigger
some sort of duty, and that there is some support for including the
suppression of genocide as such a duty.
C. OtherJustificationsfor the Convention
While popular opinion adopts the view that the framers of the
Genocide Convention must have intended to create some sort of

176.

See Jamal Jafari, "Never Again," Again: Darfur,the Genocide Convention, and the

Duty to Prevent Genocide, 12 No. 1 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 8 (2004).
177. See GENOCIDE CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1987 (1988), S. REP.,
reprintedin 28 I.L.M. 754, 763 (1985).
178.
Winston P. Nagan serves as Professor of Law, Samuel T. Dell Research
Scholar, and Affiliate Professor of Anthropology at the University of Florida. Professor
Nagan has been the Founding Director of the University of Florida's Institute for Human
Rights and Peace Development as well as the Board Chairman of Amnesty International
USA. Information from The Website of the University of Florida, Spotlight, Nagan,
availableat http://www.ufl.edu/spotlight/nagan.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
179. See Winston P. Nagan & Vivile R. Rodin, Racism, Genocide, and Mass
Murder: Toward a Legal Theory About Group Deprivations, 17 NAT'L. BLACK L.J. 133,
188 (2003-2004).
180. See Barcelona Traction (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 31-32 (Feb. 5).
181. Joseph Betz is a Professor of Philosophy at Villanova University. He
specializes in the areas of social philosophy and "just-war" theory. The faculty listing
for the Villanova University Department of Philosophy is available at http://www.
philosophy.villanova.edu/faculty.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
182. See Joseph Betz, Just a War: America's 2003 War ofAggression Against Iraq,
9 NEXUS 145, 151 (2004).

obligation to act in the face of genocide, other potential purposes for
drafting the Convention should be considered. It is conceivable that the
purpose of the Genocide Convention was simply to call attention to the
atrocities of the Holocaust. In the midst of the "never again" mentality
that permeated Jewish, European, and even international policy at the
end of World War II, it seems quite reasonable that the architects of the
Genocide Convention were seeking to put down on paper, to make
permanent, some sort of reminder for the world of the horrors of the
Holocaust.
It is also quite possible that the framers of the Convention were
aiming to create some sort of "moral authority." By making it clear that
every state-party to the Convention condemned the practice of genocide,
the framers may have hoped that the Convention would send an
unambiguous signal to the rest of the world that the commission of such
an act was against the collective values of the group and would not be
condoned. Similarly, the drafters of the Genocide Convention may have
been seeking to make any potential future perpetrators of genocidal acts
think that they would be held accountable for their actions. Finally, it
seems plausible that given the skeptical approach with which many
nations view the binding nature of international legal obligations, the
architects of the Convention may have been attempting only to create an
impetus for the enactment of domestic legislation that would echo the
Convention's sentiments.
It is likely that these foregoing explanations played a part in inspiring
the creation of the Genocide Convention. However, the validity of any
of these explanations does not necessarily discredit the possibility that
the authors of the Convention were in fact striving to create a system
that would obligate the state-parties to take action when faced with the
"odious scourge" of genocide. In light of the reluctant use of the term
"genocide" when describing horrific atrocities-for fear of initiating
some sort of international obligation-and given that the weight of
scholarly opinion suggests that the Genocide Convention creates at the
very least a legislative and adjudicative obligation, it seems that one
would be justified in assuming that such an obligation to act does exist.
VIII. ADDRESSING STATE CONCERNS REGARDING HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION TO PREVENT OR PUNISH ACTS
OF GENOCIDE

Even when humanitarian intervention is initiated in response to acts of
genocide, it is likely that individual nation-states will have some
concerns regarding the use of such action. These concerns may come
from both (a) the state acting in response to its obligation under the
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Convention to prevent and to punish genocide, and (b) the state on
whose territory such an intervention would occur, if these are not one
and the same. Such reservations can be expected to relate to issues of
individual state interest, state sovereignty, and misgivings about the
potential for an ulterior motive behind the intervention.
While each of the parties that has signed and ratified the Genocide
Convention has unambiguously professed the act of genocide to be
unacceptable and, in accordance with the Convention, enacted domestic
legislation to give its provisions effect, those same states have stood by
while genocidal acts have occurred. It is certainly possible that the
problem is one of ignorance: either the state-parties to the Convention do
not know that the incidents are occurring (or do not know the extent of
the atrocities) or they do not understand their obligations under the
Convention. The latter possibility seems especially plausible in light of
the foregoing discussion of the way in which states view their duties
under the Convention and the influence of international law in general.
Yet it also seems probable that state-parties' inaction in the face of
genocide is a reflection of the individual interests of these states. This
notion that states will comply with a treaty or convention only when
doing so serves their individual interests is reflected
in the writings of
1 83
the neorealist school of international relations.
Neorealist thought seems especially applicable in reference to
international humanitarian intervention. Cynics will point to the rapid
intervention in conflicts involving oil-rich countries like Kuwait,' 84 but
the slow response time in coming to the aid of less wealthy nations like
Rwanda.18 5 In fact the United States, the world's largest contributor to
183.

See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111
1945-46 (2002) (Explaining that according to neorealist theory, "if

YALE L.J. 1935,

compliance with international law occurs, it is not because the law is effective, but
merely because compliance is coincident with the path dictated by self-intefest in a
world governed by anarchy and relative state power.").
184. See Timeline: Kuwait, BBC NEWS ONLINE, Jul. 3, 2004, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middleeast/countryprofiles/2391051 .stm (last visited
Jan. 27, 2006).
185. See Why Not Rwanda?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 16, 1994, at 7. On January
11, 1994, the military commander of the U.N. peacekeeping force in Rwanda, General
Romeo Dallaire, sent a fax to U.N. headquarters in New York, warning that genocide
was being planned by the Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority. Despite the Dallaire
fax and other credible evidence, the U.N. did not even set up a Commission of Experts to
investigate the situation until almost 6 months later. See Karin Davies, Annan: UN
Lacked Members' Support to Prevent Rwandan Genocide, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE,
May 4, 1998.

international humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts, 186 articulated the
narrowing scope of its involvement in such peacekeeping operations in
President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25).'8 7
PDD-25, which was widely considered to be a response to the ill-fated
peacekeeping missions to Somalia and Haiti, 88 included provisions
suggesting that the United States: (a) would scale back its donations for
international peacekeeping, and (b) would apply stricter criteria before
agreeing to involve its troops in any peacekeeping operation or to place
its troops under U.N. command. 89 While expounding on the reductions
to be made in the United States' support of international peacekeeping
operations in the name of American interests, PDD-25 also explicitly
states America's desire to remain involved in such peacekeeping
operations that are in the interest of the United States. 190 Thus, PDD-25
can be seen as a reflection of the strong influence that a state's
individual interests have on a state's decision to act in the face of
international humanitarian crisis situations.
While concerns over individual state interest are likely to be raised (in
internal processes if not in external international affairs) by state-parties
that are called on to intervene in the face of genocide, the state
sovereignty issue is one that is likely to be raised by the state in which
intervention is occurring. States are likely to protest the intrusion into
their borders and the interference in their domestic issues. The dispute
over state sovereignty is an ubiquitous topic in international relations. 19'
Effectuating the goals of the United Nations while respecting the
186. From 1996-2001, the U.S. donated an estimated $3.45 billion to support U.N.
peacekeeping. Over this same time, the U.S. also supplied $24.2 billion worth of
indirect contributions (mainly in the form of military operations and services) to support
U.N. peacekeeping. While the U.S. has traditionally paid over 30% of the total cost of
U.N. peacekeeping, in 1994 the U.S. Congress passed legislation limiting the share that
the U.S. would pay to 25 percent. See United States General Accounting Office, Report
to Congressional Requesters, U.N. Peacekeeping: Estimated U.S. Contributions, Fiscal
Years 1996-2001, GAO-02-294, Feb. 2002, at 2-4.
187. See Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,
Bureau of International Organizational Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Feb. 22, 1996,
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2006)
[hereinafter PDD-25].
188. See Elaine Sciolino, New U.S. Peacekeeping Policy DeEemphasizes Role of
the UN, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1994, at Al.
189. See PDD-25, supra note 187.
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an
Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 782 (2003); John R. Worth, Note,
Globalization and the Myth of Absolute National Sovereignty: Reconsidering the "Unsigning" of the Rome Statute and the Legacy of Senator Bricker, 79 IND. L.J. 245, 258-63
(2004); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Sovereign God, Sovereign State, Sovereign Self, 66 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1355, 1355 (1991); Adeno Addis, The Thin State in Thick Globalism:
Sovereignty in the Information Age, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 4 n.4 (2004).
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sovereignty of individual states has long been a contentious issue within
the united Nations. This balance between national sovereignty and the
maintenance of international
peace and security is reflected in Article 2
92
of the U.N. Charter.1
While concerns related to individual state interest and state sovereignty
are not unimportant, when compared to the catastrophic loss of human
life that results from acts of genocide, the importance attached to such
concerns must inevitably diminish. In the face of such an atrocity,
individual state concerns relating to state interest and sovereignty must be
put aside. Professor Fernando Teson' 93 has argued for the primacy of
human rights over state sovereignty rights, and even expanded on this
concept to suggest that force used in defense of fundamental human rights is
in fact consistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 194 Even
Secretary General Kofi Annan has referenced the existence of a moral duty
to act to suppress such atrocities. 95 Thus, while the international community
should respect individual state interests such as state sovereignty under
normal conditions, these rights must become secondary to fundamental
human rights when acts of genocide are occurring.
192. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state ... but this principle shall not prejudice the application
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.").
193. Fernando Teson serves as Tobias Simon Eminent Scholar and Professor of
Law at Florida State University. Professor Teson has written and lectured extensively in
the areas of international law and international human rights, and international
humanitarian law. The Website of the Florida State University College of Law,
Fernando Teson, availableat http://www.law.fsu.edu/faculty/profiles/fteson.html (last
visited Jan. 27, 2006).
194.

FERNANDO TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND

MORALITY 173-74 (2d ed. 1997) ("The human rights imperative underlies the concepts
of state and government and the precepts that are designed to protect them,
most prominently article 2(4) [of the U.N. Charter]. The rights of states
recognized by international law are meaningful only on the assumption that
those states minimally observe individual rights. The United Nations purpose
of promoting and protecting human rights found in article 1(3), and by
reference in article 2(4) as a qualifying clause to the prohibition of war, has a
necessary primacy over the respect for state sovereignty. Force used in defense
of fundamental human rights is therefore not a use of force inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.").
195. See Kofi Annan, "We the Peoples ": The Role of the United Nations in the 21st
Century, MILLENIUM REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS 48

(2000), availableat http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2006)
(Suggesting that where crimes against humanity are being committed "and peaceful
attempts to halt them have been exhausted, the Security Council has a moral duty to act
on behalf of the international community.").

IX. CONCLUSION

While the creation of the Genocide Convention marked an important
moment in the acknowledgement and recognition of international human
rights, it has been unsuccessful in effecting its ultimate purpose:
punishing and preventing the commission of the crime of genocide. If
the purposes of the Genocide Convention are to be given meaning, if the
crime of genocide is truly to be eradicated from the world, the
international community must adopt an interpretation of the Convention
that accepts the use of force to stop such acts. The precedents for using
such force are already in place. The numerous peacekeeping missions of
the United Nations and the unilateral actions of groups like NATO in
Kosovo have shown that the world is willing to respond to these
atrocities.
What is lacking from the equation is the formal authorization. In the
face of genocide, the world needs clarity. Ridding the world of genocide
will require three variables that have been lacking from previous efforts:
swift and deliberate action, a clear mandate, and the cooperation of the
international community. The action must be swift as the nature of
genocide causes the death toll to rise rapidly. The mandate must be
clear, so that the troops know their mission exactly, know how much
force can be used, and have a clear and verifiable goal. The international
community must also be supportive of this action. While nation-states
will inevitably have different goals relating to facets of international
relations such as economics and social interaction, fundamental human
rights must be a shared and universal part of the human experience.
The most effective way to foster a clear mandate, swift action, and
international support is to build on the existing structure. Rather than
creating a new system to deal with cases of genocide, the most prudent
course of action is to clarify the obligations of state-parties to the
Genocide Convention. As discussed in previous portions of the
comment, there is a strong international consensus that state-parties to
the Convention are not without obligation. But this obligation must be
clarified. In order to actually put meaning behind the words of the
Convention, in order to actually prevent and punish acts of genocide, the
Convention must be interpreted to impart a duty upon its state-parties to
act, and to use force if necessary, to stop acts of genocide.
The step from the existing structure to the one which I am proposing is
not so far as it may seem. The precedents of humanitarian intervention
are already in existence. The obligations of the Convention are already
perceived to be real. The moral weight given to the subject matter by
the framers of the Convention and the state-parties is undeniable. The
only thing left to do is to combine these elements into a working system.
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If the international community can adopt such a system, if some
meaning can be given to the inevitable obligations that exist under the
Genocide Convention, if the "never again" mentality can finally become
more than just a hollow promise, then perhaps those dreams dreamt so
long ago in 1948 can become a reality and the world can finally be free
of the "scourge" of genocide.
JOSHUA M. KAGAN
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